Battle of Heligoland Bight
The Battle of Heligoland Bight was the first naval action of Great War, fought on 28 August 1914 near the island of Heligoland near the main German naval base at Wilhelmshaven.
Background
In the early weeks of the Great War it was known to the British that the German High Sea Fleet was based in its North Sea ports. On 16 August the British Grand Fleet, supported by Cruiser Force C and the Harwich flotillas, had performed a sweep to within 40 miles of Heligoland, but had not encountered any German shipping. Another sweep was proposed to the Admiralty by three different authorities: On 18 August the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe, proposed: "a sweep in force at dawn on August 24th, to within 30 miles of Heligoland, the flotillas leading, covered by cruisers with the battle fleet supporting, and submarines keeping east of longitude 7° 40' E and south of 54° N." Rear-Admiral Arthur H. Christian, commanding a "combined force" based at Harwich, proposed at the same time a sweep to the eastward commencing on a line from Terschelling. Commodore (S) Roger Keyes, commanding the submarines based at Harwich, also proposed a sweep. [1]
The original plan envisaged a sweep by two light cruisers and 36 destroyers, led by Commodore (T) Reginald Tyrwhitt commanding the Harwich destroyers, with Force K of the battlecruisers H.M.S. Invincible and New Zealand and four destroyers in support. The three cruisers of Force C would be in reserve. There would be two lines of submarines, an inner one of five boats and an outer one of three. The seaplane carrier H.M.S. Engadine, with two seaplanes armed with bombs and one with a torpedo, was originally intended to attack a cruiser lying off the entrance to the West Ems, but her orders were cancelled. [2]
At 1305 on 26 August, Jellicoe was informed by the Admiralty that Ostend was to be occupied in order to relieve the pressure on the left wing of the Allied army. The same message told him about the planned sweep of Heligoland Bight. His reaction was to propose that the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, the First Light Cruiser Squadron and 2nd and Fourth Destroyer Flotilla should support the operations, with the battleships nearby. The Admiralty replied the battleships were not required but that the other forces should rendezvous with the Humber Force. The Naval Staff Monograph states that this decision was entirely justified by the outcome of the battle. However, it required late changes to orders that were not received by Tyrwhitt and Keyes. [3]
The final plan involved the following forces:
Supporting Force Grand Fleet Detachment: First Battle Cruiser Squadron: Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, (a) Lion, Queen Mary and Princess Royal. First Light Cruiser Squadron Commodore William Goodenough, Southampton, Birmingham, Nottingham, Lowestoft, Falmouth and Liverpool. Second Destroyer Flotilla and Fourth Destroyer Flotilla Cruiser Force K: Rear Admiral Archibald Moore, Invincible, New Zealand and four destroyers.
In Reserve (b) Cruiser Force C: Rear Admiral Arthur H. Christian, Euryalus, Aboukir, Bacchante, Cressy and Hogue.
Sweeping Force (c) Arethusa Commodore (T) Reginald Tyrwhitt Fearless, Third Destroyer Flotilla of 16 L class destroyers and First Destroyer Flotilla of 15 Acheron class destroyers. (d) Submarines: 3 E class at Heligoland, 3 E class in outer line and 2 D class class off the Ems. (e) Submarines tenders: Lurcher (Commodore (S) Roger Keyes) and Firedrake.
Action
The submarines began to move on 26 August, with all forces being underway by the next day. Tyrwhitt learnt of the involvement of Goodenough and David Beatty's ships when he encountered the former at 03:45 on 28 August. All forces were in position by 05:00 that day. [4]
During the day, the Germans defended the Bight by two lines of U boats: one of five boats and one of four. At night, it was covered by an outer line of destroyers 25 miles from the coast and an inner line of minesweepers 12 miles offshore, supported by three light cruisers. The flaws in the German defensive plan were that it did not consider the possibility of an attack by capital ships and that the tides meant that large German ships could not pass over the Jade Bar to sea in certain times of day. On the morning of 28 August, it was light by 04:00, with the sun rising about 05:00. The sea was smooth but visibility was poor and the sky overcast.[5]
British Torpedo Analysis
The Royal Navy quantised its use of torpedoes during the action thusly.[6]
Fired at Cöln, judged collectively to have 95.8% chance of a hit | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Time | Firing Ship | Range (yds) | Enemy Speed (knots) | Inclination | Result |
11:30am | Lennox | 3,000 | 20 | 150 | — |
11:45am | Legion | 5,000 | 20 | 90L | — |
9:11am | Liberty | 6,000 | 20 | 90L | — |
1:00pm | New Zealand | 4,000 | 0 | — | Hit amidships |
1:15pm | New Zealand | 5,000 | very slow | — | Ran under |
The claimed "miss under" to New Zealand might be due to the torpedoes being set for 18 feet depth and Koln having a draught of 17.75 feet.
Fired at "4 funnel light cruiser" | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Time | Firing Ship | Range (yds) | Enemy Speed (knots) | Inclination | Result |
11:00am | Lance | 4-5,000 | 15 | 70L | Missed ahead? |
11:00am | Lysander | 6,000 | 17 | 110L | — |
Forenoon | Lark | 6,000 | — | 90R | — |
11:30am | Acheron x two | 4,500 | — | 93L | Target avoided by turning |
Archer | 4,500 | 20 | 113L | ||
Attack x two | 5,000 | — | 113L | ||
— | Hind x two | 4,500 | 22 | 110R | |
Noon | Lookout x two | 5,000 | 20 | 90R | — |
Fired at Mainz | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Time | Firing Ship | Range (yds) | Enemy Speed (knots) | Inclination | Notes/Result |
— | Fearless | 5,000 | 21 | 90R | — |
— | Fearless | 7,000 | 21 | 135R | — |
— | Defender | 4,500 | 27 | 110R | Believed hit |
9:11am | Liberty | 5,000 | 20 | 90L | — |
9:11am | Liberty | 5,000 | 20 | 90L | — |
9:11am | Linnet | 3,500 | 0 | — | Hit abaft fore funnel |
10:30am | Ferret | 5,000 | 25 | source incomprehensible |
target turned |
10:30am | Laforey | 5,000 | 10 | 130R | — |
— | Laforey | 5,000 | 10 | 130R | hit port quarter[7] |
10:43am | Laertes | 3,500 | 17 | 120L | H.S., Hit near fore funnel |
11:00am | Lydiard | 4,500 | 12 | 90R | H.S., hit tween funnels 2&3 |
11:20am | Lance | 3,500/ 4,000 |
18-20 | 45L | — |
11:45am | Lysander | 4,500 | 20 | 110L | — |
11:45am | Lysander | 4,500 | 20 | 110L | hit engine room |
11:45am | Southampton | 8,500 | 0 | — | — |
11:56am | Ariel | 6,000 | 18 | 140L | Target turned |
Noon | Lark | 4,000 | Not stated | 90R | — |
Noon | Lark | 3,000 | Not stated | 90R | hit Stb quarter |
Noon | Landrail | 5,000 | 6 | 100L | Believed hit |
Noon | Landrail | 5,000 | 6 | 100L | Believed hit |
12:15pm | Legion | 5,500 | 22 | 90L | Hit near fore funnel |
12:15pm | Falmouth | 4,000 | 20 | 110L | — |
12:20pm | Falmouth | 5,000 | 10 | 90L | Believed hit |
1:00pm | Laurel | 800 | 20 | 135R | Hit under main mast |
Firings at other targets | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Time | Firing Ship | Range (yds) | Enemy Speed (knots) | Inclination | Target/Result | |
7:45am | Lance | 3,500/ 4,000 |
18 | 100R | Ariadne, unclear | |
7:45am | Lydiard | 6,000 | 15 | 110L | Frauenlob, unlikely | |
8:00am | Ferret | 5,000 | 20 | 90R | 2-funnel L.C. turned | |
8:30am | Arethusa | 2,500 | 12 | 93L | Frauenlob hit, H.S. setting | |
8:30am | Arethusa | 2,500 | 12 | 93L | missed 50 yards astern, H.S. setting | |
9:11am | Linnet | 14,000 | too far away to say | |||
Forenoon | Lark | 5,000 | — | 90R | Ariadne, unsure | |
11:19am | Phoenix | 4,000 | 20 | 90R | Light cruiser, unsure |
Honours
By Admiralty Order, each ship that was engaged in the action was to have the words "Heligoland, August 28th, 1914" painted on her in gold letters "in some convenient place." Additionally, H.M.S. Arethusa was to have a two stanza verse engraved on a brass plate.[8]
See Also
Footnotes
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.110-11.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.111-12.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.113.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.115.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.119.
- ↑ Annual Report of the Torpedo School, 1915. pp. 22-23.
- ↑ how this hit the port quarter from the given inclination seems puzzling
- ↑ Admiralty Weekly Order No. 414 of 29 Sep, 1914. Arethusa's inscription is on her page..
Bibliography
- Corbett, Sir Julian S. (1921). Naval Operations. Volume II. London: Longmans, Green and Co..
- Goldrick, James (1984). The King's Ships Were At Sea: The War in the North Sea August 1914–February 1916. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-334-2.
- Marder, Arthur Jacob (1965). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: The War Years : To the Eve of Jutland.. Volume II. London: Oxford University Press.
- Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division (1921). Naval Staff Monographs (Historical). Fleet Issue. Volume III. Monograph 6.—Passage of the British Expeditionary Force, August, 1914. Monograph 7.—The Patrol Flotillas at the Commencement of the War. Monograph 11.—The Battle of Heligoland Bight, August 28th, 1914. Monograph 8.—Naval Operations Connected with the Raid on the North-East Coast, December 16th, 1914. Monograph 12:—The Action of Dogger Bank, January 24th, 1915. O.U. 6181 (late C.B. 1585.). Copy No. 127 at The National Archives. ADM 186/610.